

International Internet Filtering Frameworks



Alana Maurushat Faculty of Law, Cyberspace Law & Policy Centre, UNSW















SOURCES:

• ONI (OpenNet Initiative)

http://opennet.net

- Media Reporting, Legal Documents, Experts
- Confidential Sources





Legislating mandatory filtering at ISP level:	No	Yes
Voluntary / Industry filtering at ISP level:	Yes	No
Opt-out Provision:	No	Yes & No
Project Name:	Project Cleanfeed	Cleanfeed
Blacklist Filtering of blocked URLs:	Yes	Yes
Type of Material Blocked:	Child Pornography	Child Pornography, R-rated, Other
		'Illegal Content'?
Blacklist Maintained By:	Cybertip.ca	ACMA
IP Address Blocking:	No	?
Deep Packet Inspection:	Yes	?
Purpose:	Traffic shaping	?
Other Heuristic Methods:	Not yet	Yes
P2P:	Soon	No
Instant Messaging:	Soon	No
Scope Creep:	Yes	Likely
Offense to Circumvent Filters:	No	Yes
Legislative Safeguards:	No	No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Market Safeguard:

Technical Safeguard:



content infringement



Legislating mandatory filtering at ISP level:

Voluntary / Industry filtering at ISP level:

Opt-out provision:

Project Name:

No
Yes
No
Yes & No
Project Cleanfeed

Cleanfeed

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Type of Material Blocked: Child Pornography Child Pornography

& Other 'Illegal Content'

Blacklist Maintained by: Internet Watch Foundation ACMA

IP Address Blocking: No ?

Deep Packet Inspection: Yes ?

Purpose: Traffic shaping & ?

Other Heuristic Methods: Not yet Yes

P2P: Yes No

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Scope Creep: Yes Likely

Offense to Circumvent Filters: No Yes

Legislative Safeguards: No No

Market Safeguard: Yes No

Technical Safeguard: Yes No





- Voluntary ISP Initiative (walking the plank)
- Non-state filtering not subject to restraints of Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms
- Scope Creep (hate, pro-terrorism, suicide)
- Smaller ISPs are not part of scheme
- Content Filtering (copyright) in negotiation and may include some form of Deep Packet Inspection, heuristic method, blocking IP addressed, warning systems)
- Little to no media coverage / not a politically sensitive topic for child pornography
- Content Filtering is contentious



Salient Points



- Covert state-sponsored censorship (child pornography)
- Scope Creep (hate, obscenity, proterrorism, Suicide)
- Minimal media coverage & mostly uncontroversial (child pornography)
- State sponsored filtering subject to European Court of Human Rights
- Conflicting duties in European Context
- Filesharing filters separate regime
- 3 strikes you're out (copying France)

FILESHARING



- Belgium, France, Germany court mandated blocking
- Copyright Directive (cannot authorise infringement) vs. E-Commerce Directive (ISPs mere conduits & no obligation to monitor)

Contrast With Australia

- iiNet lawsuit in Australia
- Scope of 'illegal content' in Senator Conroy's proposal is unknown









Gateways

* State Secret (4?)

Internet Access Providers

* 9 state-licensed

Internet Service Providers

* Over 600 (foreign and national)

Internet Content Providers

* News Agencies, chatroom moderators, media, website owners

Internet User Hubs

* Universities, corporations, cybercafés





URL Blocking

IP address Blocking

P2P monitoring / instant message / blog / Skype

Deep Packet Inspection

Heuristic Filtering

Personal Computer in Home and Mobile Phones

Netherlands

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

- Currently Dutch Police manage blacklist of child pornography which they ask ISPs to block
- New Dutch proposal will have an independent foundation managing a blacklist in cooperation with ISPs who are currently working on a self-regulatory proposal
- ISPs have indicated that they have a responsibility to combat child pornography but that filtering is ineffective
- Expert study commissioned:
 - goal should be to restrict volume of child pornography
 - more effective takedown schemes, better police & digital forensics training, amend laws to facilitate EXPEDIENT removal & prosecution, Netherlands to lead the way to forging more international agreement and cooperation